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11. Introduction
It has been suggested that trade unions may affect the level of capital stock through
their impact on wages and employment. Originally, Grout (1984) argued that in a
situation where firms and trade unions bargain over both the wage and employment,
the unions will have a negative effect on the level of investment in the absence of
committed wage negotiation. Moreover, he argued that without binding contracts a
higher bargaining power of the trade union will always lower the capital stock. van
der Ploeg (1987) demonstrated the similar result in the right-to-manage case where
the wage is subject to bargaining under the condition that labour demand is
determined by firms. Anderson and Devereux (1988) suggested that the presence of
monopoly trade union might lead to more serious adverse welfare effects than in the
frameworks, which abstract from the strategic effect of the firm’s investment
decision, i.e. when the firm can commit itself to a capital stock decision before
wage determination. Anderson and Devereux (1991) used a monopoly trade union
model to study the trade-off between the benefits of wage commitment and the costs
of wage inflexibility in the design of the optimal contract length. They argue that
there is a natural welfare trade-off between wage commitment and wage flexibility.
Devereux and Lockwood (1991) used a simple overlapping generations (OG)
model with capital (Diamond 1965) and unions to provide a counterexample to
some findings of Grout (1984) and van der Ploeg (1987). They argued that a move
from a committed to a flexible wage negotiation, i.e. when wages are negotiated not
before but after the capital stock decision, may increase the capital stock as a result
of the rise in the trade union’s bargaining power. This occurs in their model because
higher bargaining power of trade union increases wage income and thus savings of
the young generation.
de la Croix and Licandro (1995) utilized a slightly different version of an OG
model with capital and unions to investigate the effects of different types of
irreversibilities on economic growth. Among other things they showed that a rise in
trade union power may induce a crowding-out of physical capital by pure profits so
that the effect on capital stock in their model is ambiguous.
Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2002) and Bertocchi (2003) have
recognized the importance of trade unions for economic growth. They have utilized
the overlapping generations model with trade unions to study certain issues of
2economic growth. Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga have shown that
endogenous growth is possible in a rather simple OG model with imperfect
competition including wage bargaining. Bertocchi on the other hand has argued that
e.g. the convergence of incomes between countries depends heavily on the structure
of their labour markets. Both of these papers, however, and unlike we, utilize
efficient wage bargaining.
It is important to point out that in most of these papers the emphasis was not
in the precise analysis of stability and dynamics. We focus on these issues by
extending the model of Devereux and Lockwood (1991). We use the right-to-
manage wage bargaining and derive labour demand given the negotiated wage and
capital stock decided by firms. We modify a closed economy OG framework by
incorporating imperfectly competitive labour markets via Nash wage bargaining.
Under right-to manage wage bargaining, where employment is not negotiated but
decided by firms, we assume that wage is negotiated given the capital stock. Wage
bargaining takes place between the young workers and the old capitalists.
We demonstrate the following results. With Cobb-Douglas utility and
production functions the economy’s steady state is unique under imperfectly
competitive labour market, and the steady state capital stock depends positively on
the trade union’s bargaining power. This happens because higher bargaining power
of the trade union will induce workers to save more, which boosts the capital stock.
Finally, we study the dynamics of the model and show that the steady state
equilibrium is a saddle point.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the basic framework and
comparative statics of an overlapping generations model under Nash wage
bargaining, where wages are negotiated after the capital stock has been decided by
the representative firm. Section 3 analyses the steady state equilibrium and
dynamics under flexible wage negotiation. Finally, there is a concluding section
where we briefly summarize our new findings.
2. An Overlapping Generations Model under Wage Bargaining
We study an overlapping generations model without population growth (the
amount of population is normalized to be unity) and with perfect foresight. The
young in each period are endowed with one unit of time, which they inelastically
3supply to the market. Their retirement consumption is provided by their savings,
which can be invested in two assets. They supply capital to the firms, and also buy
shares of those firms. There is an operative stock market here, because there will
be profits due to the existence of trade unions and decreasing returns to scale.
These are due either to technology, one fixed input or imperfectly competitive
product markets. Later on we describe these three possibilities more precisely.
We incorporate imperfect competition in labour markets into an overlapping
generations model. The young workers form a labor union. They negotiate about
the wage with the firm’s owners. There is right-to-manage (RTM), and thus
employment is determined by firms (for alternative formulations of trade union
models, see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), chapter 7).
As in Devereux and Lockwood (1991) we assume that the worker-consumers
have the following Cobb-Douglas utility function
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where itjc
,  refers to the consumption of the person born at the beginning of period t
in the thj  period of his life ( 2,1?j ) if he is either employed ( Ei ? ) or
unemployed ( Ui ? ). The young of each generation are endowed with a unit of
labour which they supply inelastically. The periodic budget constraints of the
employed person are
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The unemployed person’s constraints are respectively
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The young can save in two assets. itk 1?  denotes the supply of capital and
i
t 1??  the
number of shares bought by consumer  of type i . tq  is the price of a share in
period t , and 1?td  denotes the dividend per share paid in period 1?t . tw  is the
wage rate and tb  is the exogenously given unemployment insurance compensation.
1?tR  is the interest factor (and the gross return on capital) between periods t and
t+1. Because there is no uncertainty, there is an obvious arbitrage condition here,
which says that the return on investing in capital should be equal to investing in the
4shares of the firms, i.e. tttt qqdR /)( 111 ??? ?? . This means that the lifetime budget
constraint is itt
itit IRcc ?? ?1
,
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i
tI  denotes the income of the type i  worker-
consumer.
We can define total savings as itt
i
t
i
t
qks 11 ?? ?? ? . Given the utility function the
saving can be solved to get it
i
t
Is )1( ??? , where ? is constant. This means that total
savings do not depend on the interest factor, because with Cobb-Douglas utility
function the substitution and income effect cancel each other out. We can thus
write the indirect utility functions of both types as
(4i) wRwRRwV E ???? ??? ??? ??? 111 ˆ)1(),(
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where .)1(ˆ 1 ?? ??? ???  Thus the utility depends positively both on wage income
and the rate of return on savings.
The firms are assumed to have the following production function:
? ????? ?? 1),( nKLKF , with 10 ?? ?  and 10 ?? ? . The restriction on the
parameter ?  can be given three different justifications.
We can assume that (i) the production function has decreasing returns-to-
scale so that .1??  In this case we also have decreasing returns to scale in terms of
capital and labour. (ii) Our decreasing returns to scale specification can be justified
also in a realistic way by assuming that (a) the production technology has a
property of constant returns to scale in terms of capital and labour so that
1?? ?? , but (b) product markets are imperfectly competitive. Assuming e.g. an
iso-elastic demand function ??? ppD )(  ( p  is the product price) , we can write
the firm’s gross revenue function as )/1(1 ??? FpF , where the price elasticity of
product demand is higher than one, but less than infinity i.e. 1)/1(1 ??? ?? . This
monopolistic competition assumption (see e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) also
provides a justification for our decreasing returns to scale assumption in production
technology. (iii) Finally, this can also be justified by assuming that there is a three
factor technology with constant returns to scale, i.e. )(1),,( ???? ??? MnKMnKF ,
when input M  is fixed.
The firms rent capital from consumers and hire labour. Their profit will be
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We will consider the case of what Devereux and Lockwood (1991) call a
non-binding solution. This means that firms have committed to a level of capital
stock before they negotiate about the wage (see also de la Croix and Licandro
(1995)). In a recent study Hellwig (2004) has compared a number of key properties
associated with two alternative timing structures between negotiated wage setting
and investment decisions within the framework of an intertemporal general
equilibrium model. He suggests that although the long-term labour demand with
endogenous investment is more elastic than the short-term demand, it does not
necessarily lead to a less aggressive wage policy. The wage-employment trade-off
in his model depends on whether the elasticity of substitution in production is
lower than or higher than the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility in
consumption. Our present analysis does not address these hold-up problems. They
might be particularly important, if firms can adjust their investment decisions in
the short run.
The first-order condition for employment is (dropping the time subscripts for
convenience) with a given level of capital stock
(6) wnK ?? ?? 1)1()1( ?????? .
Solving the labor demand we get
(7) ? ? ??????????? ???? ?? ???? wKwKn )/)1(()1( ,
where ? ?)1(1/1/ ??? ????? nwnw , which is greater than unity because
1,0 ?? ?? . We denote by 1/)1( ??? B?? . Labour demand depends negatively
on wage and positively on capital stock, since capital and labour are complements in
production, i.e. 0?nKF .
The representative firm and the trade union negotiate about the wage given
that the firms are on their labour demand curve. Instead of efficient bargaining we
use the RTM approach. The negotiated wage rate can then be solved from the
following Nash bargaining problem
(PN) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?????? 1ttttt
w
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6where tU  ( tU )  denotes the utility (fallback utility) of the trade union, t? is the
fallback profit of the firm and ?  denotes the relative bargaining power of trade
union.1 Trade union cares about the employed and unemployed. Thus we assume
that Utt
E
ttt VnVnU )1( ??? . Since an unemployed person gets an unemployment
insurance compensation we assume that Utt VU ? . Given the fact that firms have
committed to the level of capital stock before wage negotiations, they have to pay
the rentals even in the case of no agreement. This means that ttt Kr??? .
Incorporating the fallback utility and profit into (PN) we can now rewrite the
RTM Nash bargaining problem as
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                              s.t. ????? ?? wKBn .
The first-order condition reduces to
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Given the production function, equation (8) can be expressed in a standard way as
(9) ? ?? ? t
N
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1
?
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The negotiated wage depends positively on the level of unemployment insurance
compensation and trade union’s relative bargaining power, while negatively on the
wage elasticity of labour demand, which becomes higher with more intensified
product market competition. It is important to keep in mind that in the case of
Cobb-Douglas production function the negotiated wage does not depend on the
level of capital stock, since the wage elasticity of labour demand is constant, i.e. it
only depends on the parameters
?
? 11??  and ? .
1   The Nash maximand (PN’ below), i.e. the weighted product of the net gains of the bargainers,
can be justified both via the axiomatic approach by Nash (1950) and via the strategic approach
by Rubinstein  (1982). These approaches are of course very different, but interestingly, Nash’s
axiomatic solution can also be obtained as a limit solution to a non-cooperative game in which
the time interval between alternative offers approaches zero (see Binmore et. al, 1986 for a proof
of this assertion).
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workers (i.e. t
N
t nw ) is
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The share of output going to the owners ( )wnF ?? can be expressed as follows
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In what follows we denote the mark-up between the negotiated wage and
unemployment insurance compensation by A???? )1/()1( ??? . Thus we can
rewrite equation (11) as follows
(12) ? ?BbAKBnwnKF N ??? ??? 1),( 111 ??????? .
We can now write dividends ( )rKwnFDiv ??? ?  as
(13) ? ? rKBbAKBDiv ??? ??? 1111 ?????? .
 We first note that 1))1(1/( ???? ??????? , and
? ? 01111 ?????? HBbAB ??? . The partial derivatives of H  are: 0?AH  and 0?bH .
We also note that ? ?1)1(11 ??? ?? BbAH B ?? so that 0?BH , since 1)1( ?? B? .
The signs of derivatives are intuitive. A higher mark-up and higher unemployment
insurance compensation will increase the wage demands, and thus have a negative
effect on dividends.
We note that dividend is a strictly concave function of the capital stock, and
fulfils the conditions ??
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?
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K
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lim . There is then an interior
maximizing solution given that 0?H . The first-order condition for a maximum
capital stock will then be
(15) rHK ??1?????? ,
where we can solve for the optimal capital stock and also use it to compute the
dividend as a function of the capital stock as
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In the next section we explore stability and dynamics under flexible RTM
wage negotiations.
3. Steady States and Dynamical Equilibria under Flexible Wage
Negotiation
We can now characterize the equilibrium of this economy. Saving must be
allocated to the capital stock and the shares of the firm. The second equilibrium
condition is the arbitrage condition for the returns from investing in the capital
stock and the shares. The total capital stock ( 1?tK ) must be equal to the amount
saved to capital by the employed and unemployed workers (i.e. Utt
E
tt knkn 11 )1( ?? ?? ).
We normalize the aggregate number of shares to be unity, i.e.
that 1)1( 11 ??? ??
U
tt
E
tt nn ?? . Given this normalization and the utility function (i.e. the
saving behavior) we get the following capital market equilibrium condition
(17) ? ? tttttt qbbwnK ?????? )()1(1 ? .
The arbitrage condition,
(18) 111 )1( ??? ??? tttt dqrq ,
is the other equilibrium condition.
Given the negotiated wage (9), the first order condition for a maximum
capital stock (15) and the dividend as a function of the capital stock (16) we get the
following dynamical system for the capital stock and the share price
(19) ? ? ttt qbAbBAbKK ????? ?? )1()()1(1 ??????
(20) ? ? ????? ?????? )1(1 1111 ???? ???? HKqHKq tttt .
 In the steady state ( 0?? tK and 0?? tq ) we have
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The first equation describing the capital market equilibrium condition in
steady state is nonlinear, while the second one, describing the arbitrage condition,
is linear. We note from (21) that 0)1()0( ??? bG ?  and
9? ? 1)1()()1()(' 1 ???? ?? ????????? KAbBAbKG . We can see that ??
?
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0
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K
. One can see that the slope of (22) decreases, when the
elasticity of output with respect to capital stock ( ?? ) increases. These properties
imply that we can draw the following diagram, which shows that the steady state
( *K ) is unique.
Figure 1. Steady state.
*K
K
Kq
??
??
?
1
)(KGq ?
q
)0(G
We collect the previous findings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1: With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions the steady
 state of the OG economy described by equations (21) and (22) is
unique, when wages are decided by the RTM bargaining before the
capital stock.
What happens to the steady state capital stock, when trade union’s
bargaining power is higher? Bargaining power affects only the first steady state
equation (21). We present the result in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2: With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, and with RTM
bargaining before the capital stock decision the steady state capital
stock is higher the bigger is the trade union’s bargaining power.
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Proof: The bargaining power, ? , affects the curve (21) through the term
)1/()1( ???? ???A . The total effect can be obtained by considering the effect of
? on ?? ?? ? AA1  (see equation (21)). Differentiating we get
? ? 11 )1( ???? ???
?
? ?
?
?? ?
?
AAAA . This is positive, since 0)1/(1 ??? ??A . This
means that the curve (21) shifts up, when the bargaining power is increased, and
thus the steady state capital stock increases. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 follows from the fact that the improved bargaining power
will induce workers to save more, ceteris paribus, which in turn boosts the capital
stock.
Next we study the dynamics of the model by considering paths for which
tt KK ??1  and tt qq ??1 . It follows from (19) that
(23) ? ? ttttt KqbAbBAbKKK ??????? ?? )1()()1(1 ?????? .
? ? ? )()1()()1( tttt KMKbAbBAbKq ?????? ? ?????? .
We note that capital stock is growing below the curve )( tt KMq ? .
It follows from (20) for the dynamics of the arbitrage equation that
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because .1)1( ??? ???? We have thus obtained that tt qq ??1  implies that
1)/)1(( ??? tt Kq ??? . To go on to analyse the paths, where tt qq ??1 , we substitute
the expression for 1?tK  from equation (19) and obtain
(25) ? ?? ?ttt qbAbBAbKq ?????? ? )1()()1(1 ????????
? ,
which can be rewritten as
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The share price is increasing above the curve )( tt KQq ? . By differentiating (23)
and (26) with respect to K  we obtain
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We have already proved that the steady state is unique. Thus we can depict the
qualitative features of our model in Figure 2. The Figure indicates that the steady
state is a saddle.
Figure 2. Dynamics.
*K
q
K
tt KK ??1
tt qq ??1
M(0)
Q(0)
)( tt KMq ?
)( tt KQq ?
To study formally the stability properties of dynamical equilibrium, we
rewrite equation (19) as follows
(29) ? ? ),()1()()1(1 ttttt qKZqbAbBAbKK ?????? ?? ??????
Substituting the RHS of (29) for 1?tK  in (20) gives an implicit equation for 1?tq ,
(30) ),(1 ttt qKPq ??
The planar system describing the dynamics of the capital stock and the share price
consists now of equations (29) and (30). The Jacobian matrix of the partial
derivatives of the system (29)-(30) can be written as
(31) ?
?
?
?
?
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?
qK
qK
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ZZ
J ,
where
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12
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0)1)(1()1()( )1(22 ?????? ?? ????? ????? HKAbBAbPK (See Appendix 1 for
details).
We prove the following
Proposition3: The steady state equilibrium is a saddle point.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
4. Conclusions
We have explored the stability and dynamics in an overlapping generations
economy with wage bargaining. Under right-to manage bargaining, where
employment is not negotiated but decided by firms, we have assumed that wage is
negotiated given the capital stock and that wage bargaining process takes place
between the young workers and the old capitalists. We have provided the following
results.
With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions the economy’s steady
state is unique and the steady state capital stock depends positively on the trade
union’s bargaining power. This is because the higher bargaining power of the trade
union will induce workers to save more, which boosts the capital stock. Finally, we
study the dynamics of the model and show that in this OLG framework under
imperfectly competitive labour markets the steady state equilibrium is a saddle
point.
An interesting further research topic would be to analyse these issues in the
open economy framework (for one such an OG specification, see Bertocchi 2003)
and in the presence of outsourcing of economic activities under imperfectly
competitive labour markets (see e.g. Skaksen and Sorensen 2001).
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the partials of the Jacobian matrix.
We rewrite equation (20) as follows
(A1) HKHqKqq ttttt
?????? ????? 1
1
11 )1( ?
?
?? ???? .
We first compute qP  and evaluate it at the steady state to get
(A2)
1
111
?
??
?
????
t
t
q K
qHKP ?????? ,
since from the analysis in the text we know that 1/1 ???? ? tt qK . Computing from
(A1) we get
(A3) HKHqK
K
q
t
t 122
1
1 )1()1)(( ??
?
? ????
?
? ?????? ??????????
? ?????? ? KqHK ???????? ??? )1()1(2 0)1( 1 ??? ? HK?????
This means that
(A4) HKPq
11 ??? ??? ,
Next we compute KP . From (A1) we want to compute
t
t
t
t
K
K
K
q
?
?
?
? ?
?
? 1
1
1  (= KP ). We have
11 / ?? ?? tt Kq  from (A3), and get from (29)
(A5) 11 )1())()(1( ??? ???
?
? ????????? KAbBAb
K
K
t
t .
Thus we get
(A6) 0)1)(1()1()( )1(22 ?????? ?? ????? ????? HKAbBAbPK .
We can also express this as 1)1( ???? ????? HKZP KK .
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3.
We analyze the stability of the system (19) and (20), which characterizes the
dynamics of the capital stock and the share price. The characteristic polynomial
associated with the system (28) and (29) expressed in terms of D and T is
(A7) 0)( 2 ???? DTp ???
It is known from the stability theory of difference equations (see e.g. Azariadis,
1993, pp. 63-67, and de la Croix and Michel, 2002, pp. 321-322) that for a saddle
point to exist the roots of 0)( ??p  need to be on both sides of (minus and plus)
unity. Thus for a saddle we need that D-T+1 < 0 and D+T+1 > 0 or D-T+1 > 0 and
D+T+1 < 0.
The planar system describing the dynamics of the capital stock and the
share price consists now of equations (29) and (30). The Jacobian matrix of the
partial derivatives of the system can be written as
(A8) ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
qK
qK
PP
ZZ
J ,
where
? ? 0)1()()()1( 1 ???? ?? AbBAbKZK ?????????
1??qZ
14
1??? ????HKZP KK
HKPq
11 ??? ??? .
Computing the trace ( qK PZT ?? ) and determinant ( KqK PPZD ?? ) we obtain
(A9) ? ? 11)1()()()1( 11 ?????? ??? HKAbBAbKT ????????????
(A10) ? ????????? ??? HKHKZHKZPZD KKqK 111 )1(1)1( ????????? ????
? ? ? ? 0)(1)1(1(1 11 ?????? ?? ????? ?????? HKZHKZ KK .
Now we conclude that 01???TD . Next we compute 1??TD  to get
(A11) ? ?KZHKTD ?????? ????? ? 11 1 .
Rewriting we get
(A12) ? ?)1()())(1(11 121 ??????? ??? AbBAbKHKTD ???????? ???? .
We next develop the term )1()())(1( 12 ?? ?? AbBAbK ????????? from
(A12), and denote it by Y . Using the steady state relations (21) and (22) we can
express Y  as follows
(A13) ?????
?
K
AbBAbKY )1()())(1()(
2 ?????????
? ?
??
?
??
? ???
??
K
b
K
bK ?????????????? )1(1)()1()( .
Since the original term is positive, and the fact that 1???? , this must be less than
unity. This means that 01???TD  so that we have a saddle. Q.E.D.
References:
Anderson, S.P. and M.B. Devereux (1988): Trade Unions and the Choice of
Capital Stock, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90(1), 27-44.
Anderson, S.P. and M.B. Devereux (1991): The Trade-off between Pre-
commitment and Flexibility in Trade Union Wage Setting, Oxford Economic
Papers 43, 549-569.
Azariadis, C. (1993): Intertemporal Macroeconomics, Blackwell, Oxford.
Bertocchi, G. (2003): Labor Market Institutions, International Capital Mobility,
and the Persistence of Underdevelopment, Review of Economic Dynamics 6,
637-650.
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky (1986): The Nash Solution in
Economic Modeling, Rand Journal of Economics 17(2), 176-188.
Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004): Labor Economics, MIT Press.
de la Croix, D. and O. Licandro (1995): Underemployment, Irreversibilities and
Growth under Trade Unionism, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97,385-
399.
de la Croix, D. and P. Michel (2002): A Theory of Economic Growth: Dynamics
and Policy in Overlapping Generations, Cambridge University Press.
Devereux, M.B. and B. Lockwood (1991): Trade Unions, Non-binding Wage
Agreements, and Capital Accumulation, European Economic Review
35,1411-1426.
15
Diamond, P. (1965): National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, American
Economic Review 55, 1026-1050.
Dixit, A.K. and J.E. Stiglitz (1977): Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity, American Economic Review 67, 297-308.
Dos Santos Ferreira, R. and T. Lloyd-Braga (2002): Can Market Power Sustain
Endogenous Growth in Overlapping Generations Economies? Economic
Theory 20, 199-205.
Grout, P.A. (1984): Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A
 Nash Bargaining Approach, Econometrica 52, 449-460.
Hellwig, M. (2004): The Relation between Real Wage Rates and Employment: An
Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis. German Economic Review 5,
263-295.
Nash, J. (1950): The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18, 155-162.
Rubinstein, A. (1982): Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica
50,  97-109.
Skaksen, M.Y. and J.R. Sorensen (2001): Should Trade Unions Appreciate
Foreign Direct Investment?, Journal of International Economics, 55, 379-
390.
van der Ploeg, R. (1987): Trade Unions, Investment and Unemployment: A Non-
cooperative Approach, European Economic Review 31, 1469-1492.
